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CONTRACTUAL WILLS:
MISPLACED MARITAL LOYALTIES: ENSUING
LITIGATION: INCREASED FEDERAL
ESTATE TAXES
ADDISON E. DEWEY*
INTRODUCTION
A MYSTIFYING PLETHORA OF RECENT CASES indicates that husbands and
and wives seem to be placing much more euphoric confidence in the
judicial enforcement of their contractual wills 1 than they do in
unbargained-for assurances by the spouse that the provisions of such will
never be changed.2 Many cases indicate that married couples feel that
while mutual trust and confidence may be a revered tradition resulting
from matrimonial bliss, they prefer to superimpose upon testamentary
dispositions of their estates the common law concept of contract as an
agreement which the courts will enforce. 3 The repeated pattern of the
various cases is that the respective spouses agree that their property shall
be disposed of in accordance with their contractually executed wills; 4 the
first spouse to die does so with perhaps the ingenuous belief that contract
obligation will somehow compel devotion to the spousal agreement which
trust and loyalty apparently would not. It is made manifest by the case
law that when the surviving spouse changes the provisions of the will
upon which there was superimposed the contractual arrangement, the
beneficiaries under the contractual will be granted enforcement remedies
by the courts, under the theory that the changing of the contractual will
was a material breach of the contract. The typical remedy afforded by
the courts is the equitable remedy of the constructive trust.5
* BA., Capital University; J.D., Ohio State University, College of Law (cum laude);
Professor of Law, The Law School, Capital University; Past President of The League
of Ohio Law Schools.
IE.g., Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973);
Schwartz v. Horn, 31 N.Y.2d 275, 290 N.E.2d 816, 338 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1972); In re
Estate of Phillips, 54 Wis. 2d 296, 195 N.W.2d 485 (1972); Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis.
2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970). Reference is, of course, made to a "will" as a
statutorily prescribed method of testamentary disposition of one's property. See, e.g.,
OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1968).
2 See Twombly v. Twombly, 489 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1971); In re Briese's Estate, 240
Wis. 426, 3 N.W.2d 691 (1942), wherein it was held that a husband's love and
affection for his dying wife was insufficient consideration for husband's promise to
wife to support wife's mother as long as she lived.
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Central Ins. Co., 210 Tenn. 24, 356 S.W.2d 277 (1962).
4 In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 454 P.2d 438 (1969).
5 Rodke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971).
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Quite typical of the judicial reaction to contractual wills is a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska6 which may be summarized
as follows:
(1) an agreement between husband and wife to execute mutual wills
evidenced by a recital of the wills that they were executed
pursuant to agreement is valid and judicially enforceable; and
(2) the mutual promises of the parties to such an agreement are
an adequate consideration.
It seems abundantly clear that the courts are committed to the
position that the right to change one's will may be limited by a contractual
arrangement with one's spouse and, accordingly, that such contractual will,
in its agreement aspects, becomes irrevocable at the time one party to
the contract dies. 7 The concept has been stated as follows by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court:
Where two parties contract to make a joint, mutual and reciprocal
will, each pledges to the other that he will execute a mutually
agreeable will, and will have that will in full force and effect at the
time of death. The parties may express such contract in a separate
document, state in the joint will that it is a contract, or the fact of
contract may be conclusively presumed from the fact of the joint
wills being executed. Such contract becomes partially executed upon
the death of one of the parties to the agreement and acceptance
by the survivor of properties devised or bequeathed under the will
and pursuant to the agreement to make such joint will. At this
point the contract becomes irrevocable, the survivor having received
the consideration promised. 8
Against the 'background of the numerous court decisions that have
enforced the contractual wills, one can only engage in random speculation
as to what nuances of human frailty lead husband and wife to stultify their
vital right to change their wills by contract obligation. It is not the basic
6 Geiger v. Geiger, 185 Neb. 700, 178 N.W.2d 575 (1970).
7 Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973); Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 229 Ga. 677, 194 S.E.2d 91 (1972); Estate of
Randall v. McKibben, 191 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1971); Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55, 510
P.2d 167 (1973); In re Estate of Bright, 482 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1972); In re Estate
of Philips, 54 Wis. 2d 296, 195 N.W.2d 485 (1972); In re Estate of Schultz, 53 Wis.
2d 643, 193 N.W.2d 655 (1972).
8Estate of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 176 N.W.2d 561, 563-64 (1970). In United
States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1967), the United States Court of Appeals
sought to clarify some lingual confusion by lucidly defining the words "joint,"
"mutual," and "reciprocal" as those various terms have been used with respect to
alleged contractual wills. As applicable to these various terms the opinion stated:
A will is joint when it "is nothing more than a single documentary instrument
constituting the wills of two or more persons, jointly executed." Wills are
reciprocal when "two or more testators make testamentary dispositions in favor
of each other"; this may be done by one will "in which case the will is bothjoint and reciprocal." A will is mutual "only if it is executed pursuant to an
agreement," that is, "only when there is evidence sufficient to show a binding
agreement as to disposal of the property of the makers in a certain way."
377 F.2d at 96,
[Vol. 8:1
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purpose of this writer to explore the sociological overtones of such
contractual arrangements, but merely to point out that while in one sense
the contract enforcement may prove to be a great monetary windfall
for the will beneficiaries,9 in another sense the contract enforcement may
have disastrous tax implications. Federal courts have repeatedly held that
the contractual obligation imposed upon the surviving spouse converts
what would otherwise have been a bequest or devise in fee simple to the
surviving spouse into a mere life estate,10 a terminable interest which does
not qualify for the marital deduction in the estate of the first spouse to die."
One need not be too astute to recognize that because the federal estate
tax has a graduated tax structure ranging from 3 to 77 percent, 2 it is
vitally important to preserve the marital deduction in the estate of the first
spouse to die so as to avoid unnecessary tax liability.
Four areas require in-depth exploration in order, not only to establish
that the courts are enforcing contractual wills, but also to demonstrate that
the contractual burden superimposed upon the testamentary disposition
has attendant federal tax consequences. Those discussion areas are:
(1) contract relations between husband and wife with respect to
their testamentary dispositions;
(2) the nature and quantum of the evidentiary problem relative to
establishing contractual wills;
(3) judicial enforcement of contractual wills through the imposition
of a constructive trust for the benefit of those who would have
been the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the
contractual wills; and
(4) the terminable interest resulting upon the establishment of the
contractual wills and the attendant tax consequences associated
with losing the marital deduction in the estate of the first
spouse to die.
CONTRACTUAL WILLS: A CONTRACT THERE MUST BE
It would, of course, be in the alternative either a superarrogation or
an insensitive treatment of one's readers akin to the hauteur of a
pontificator to dwell upon the fundamental requisites of a contract.2 But
in numerous cases the courts have refused to enforce alleged contractual
wills because the evidence did not establish a contract.14 The courts have
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 102.
10 Estate of Krampf v. Comm'r, 464 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1972); Estate of Opal v.
Comm'r, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971); Batterton v. United States, 406 F.2d 247 (5th
Cir. 1969).
11 Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2056.
12 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954 § 2001.
13See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 19, 72 (1973).
14 E.g., Twombly v. Twombly, 489 P.2d 299 (Okla. 1973); Magids v. American Title
Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1971).
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indicated perceptive awareness that a contract is "an agreement, upon
sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing."' 5
Consonant with contract law, the promises of the husband and wife not
to change their testamentary dispositions have been held to constitute
adequate consideration for the agreement for the mutual wills. 1 6 In other
words, a promise for a promise there must be to establish the bilateral
contract.'7 However, in Oursler v. Armstrong,18 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the mere confidentiality of the relationship between
husband and wife did not establish the "promise for a promise" requisite
of a bilateral contract and hence rejected the contention that the wills of
the husband and wife were contractual. The facts of the case are a
familiar pattern: Charles Fulton Oursler had two children by his first
wife and two children by his second wife. Oursler and his second wife,
Grace, executed wills at the same time before the same attesting witnesses.
The husband's will provided that his residuary estate would go to his
second wife; but if he survived her, it would go to the four children of
both of his marriages, or to their children. The will of the second wife,
Grace, provided that her residuary estate should go to her husband, but
if she survived him, the property coming to her from Oursler would go to
the same four children of both marriages, or to their children. Oursler
died in 1952. Grace survived him. On January 21, 1955, in the year
of her death, the second wife made a new will which will left everything
to her two children of her first marriage and left nothing to the
children of Oursler's first marriage.
In Oursler the children of the first marriage sought to impress the
familiar remedy of constructive trust on the property received by
the second wife under Oursler's will. In rejecting the contentions that a
constructive trust should be imposed upon the property the second wife
received from Oursler, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the evidence did not establish any promise by the second wife to renounce
or in any way to stultify her power of testamentary disposition. The court
specifically rejected the rationale of the lower courts which sought to
impose a constructive trust by equating the moral obligation of the second
wife to the concept of quasi-contract implied in law. The court did not
find that the basic requisites of a bilateral contract had been established.
In reaching this conclusion, the court dismissed the contention that the
mere execution of reciprocal wills by husband and wife established that
such wills were contractual. The court stressed that the mere confidentiality
of the spousal relationship does not establish the requisite contract.
Various courts have made the fundamental observation that whether
15 Johnson v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 210 Tenn. 24, 34, 356 S.W.2d 277, 281 (1962).
16 Geiger v. Geiger, 185 Neb. 700, 178 N.W.2d 575 (1970).
17 Twombly v. Twombly, 489 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1971).
18 10 N.Y.2d 385, 179 N.E.2d 489, 223 N.Y.S. 477 (1961).
[Vol 8:1
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a will is contractual or not involves a question of fact which must be
established by competent evidence.' 9 It is worthy of specific note that in
a decision by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma20 in which, despite the
somewhat incredible situation that the respective wills of the husband and
wife were set forth in one document with accompanying language such
as "we the undersigned" and various references in the one testamentary
document to "our will," the court held that the proof did not show that
the surviving husband had been legally obligated by oral contract not to
revoke the joint will of the husband and wife. It was further held that
the husband was then free to revoke such will by executing a different will
following the death of his wife. The action was maintained by a grandson
against the grandfather's second wife and others to recover realty allegedly
devised to the grandson in his grandparent's joint will which was alleged
to be contractual. The land was distributed to his grandfather after his
grandmother's death, but much to the pique of the grandson, his
grandfather executed a different will which did not include the grandson
as a beneficiary. The court held that, absent the showing of contract
between grandfather and grandmother, there was no basis for the
imposition of a constructive trust. Here, rather significantly, the court
concluded that the execution of joint wills by the husband and wife
as a single testamentary document is not sufficient, of itself, to establish
the contractual relationship.
Other courts,21 however, have given substantial weight to the use of a
single document as the joint will of a husband and wife as manifesting
contractual "mutual assent" that the will not subsequently be changed.
These courts have said that the joint nature of the will does not of itself
establish it to be the result of a pre-existing agreement, but have added
that this type of will using the pronouns "we" and "our" may be
sufficient as circumstantial evidence to indicate that the joint will was
executed pursuant to a contractual arrangement. In this respect, the
Supreme Court of Kansas, 22 in finding the joint will of a husband and
wife to be contractual, concluded:
In 'arriving at this conclusion we fingered these factors: the use of
the plural words "we" and "ours" throughout the will; the directions
contained for the disposition of the testators' property after the death
of the survivor; and the carefully drawn provisions for the disposition
of any share of a lapsed residuary bequest.23
In this decision, the court also discussed the familiar ramifications of
19Estate of Randall v. McKibben, 191 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1971); In re Estate of
Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 454 P.2d 438 (1969).2OTwombly v. Twombly, 489 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1971).
21 In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 454 P.2d 438 (1969); Estate of Chayka,
47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
22 In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 454 P.2d 438 (1969).
23 Id. at 371, 454 P.2d at 442.
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the parole evidence rule and concluded that since the joint will indicated
on its face that it was contractual in nature, extrinsic evidence was not
admissible to prove otherwise. 24
The Supreme Court of Texas 25 has taken the familiar view that
wills, as distinguished from contracts, are revocable because a will is
ambulatory in the sense that it may be changed and that it speaks only at
the time of the death of the maker. However, the court specifically recog-
nized that upon proper proof of a binding contract to make testamentary
disposition of certain property, the contractual arrangement becomes
irrevocable after the death of one of the contracting parties. Thereafter
such contract may be enforced even though the survivor's will, made
pursuant thereto, has been changed or revoked. Thus the court adverted to
the familiar rule that the contract and not the will becomes irrevocable.28
It is further manifested by the decided cases that when a husband
and wife do not use a single document as their joint testamentary
disposition, but instead execute separate wills which are reciprocal in their
terms, mere proof of the execution of the separate wills does not establish
that the wills were executed pursuant to a contract between the spouses.
27
A federal court 28 has also concluded that the mere execution of reciprocal
wills, in itself, is insufficient under the applicable state law (Iowa) to
establish the requisite contract mutual assent.
SOME JUDICIAL MUSINGS ON THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
IN ESTABLISHING CONTRACTUAL WILLS
Only a brief and summary reference will be made to the evidentiary
problems presented in seeking to establish that the wills of a husband and
wife are executed pursuant to contract. These matters of proof are
tempered with the continuing caveat that even though one is successful in
his evidentiary presentation he may ultimately have substantial regrets
relative to the establishment of the contract. Such contracts effectively
convert the surviving spouse's interest into the equivalent of a life estate
which is a terminable interest not qualifying for the marital deduction
under the federal estate tax.2
24 It goes without saying that where a contract is not intended, it is important that the
language in the joint wills does not reflect otherwise.
25Magids v. American Title Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1971).
26 Id. at 464. As an evidentiary matter, the court found that a contract between the
husband and wife had not been established. See Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505
P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973); Estate of Schultz, 53 Wis. 2d 643, 193 N.W.2d
655 (1972).
27Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 179 N.E.2d 489, 223 N.Y.S. 477 (1961);
Fanning v. Fanning, 302 A.2d 299 (R.I. 1973).
28 United States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1967).
2 9 Estate of Opal v. Comm'r, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971); Batterton v. United
States, 406 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1969).
[VCOL 8:1
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The person contending that the surviving spouse breached an
agreement relative to the execution of wills between husband and wife has
the burden of proving such contractual arrangements by clear and
convincing evidence.3" But, mere proof that husband and wife executed
separate wills which were reciprocal in their terms is not enough to
establish the contract.31 Moreover, if the evidence of the contract to make
a will rests wholly in oral testimony the proof must 'be clear, satisfactory
and convincing. 32 The requirement that the oral agreement to make a will
be established by clear and convincing evidence is for the edification and
guidance of the trial court and is not a standard for appellate review.
33
It has been held that a greater quantum of proof than the mere execution
of a joint will is essential to the creation of a mutual and contractual
will, and that the proof may be by extrinsic evidence or may appear
on the face of the will, or both.
34
A person seeking to establish that a will was executed pursuant to an
oral contract may face the formidable obstacles of the typical state "dead
man" statute. Those obstacles, however, may not be insurmountable. In a
recent Georgia Case,35 the second wife in a rather typical December-June
marriage overcame the dead man statute and established the contractual
will by producing three other witnesses who did testify to the existence
and terms of the contractual arrangement between the husband and wife.
The decision also indicated that under these and similar circumstances,
contractual wills must be established by proof which is certain, definite
and clear and that such proof must establish the existence of the contract
beyond a reasonable doubt. The reference to "beyond a reasonable doubt"
as a quantum of proof in this decision seems to be a rather singular
borrowing of the proof concepts in criminal proceedings.
3O Fanning v. Fanning, 302 A.2d 299, 300- (R.I. 1973).
Sl.Id, at 300. United States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1967). As pointed out
previ6usly, there are divergent judicial viewpoints with respect to the evidentiary
impact of the so-called joint will wherein a husband and wife set forth their testamen-
tary desires in one document characterized typically by use of the pronouns "we" and
"ours." Those viewpoints fall into two basic categories. One group of courts holds
that the execution of a single document as the respective joint wills of the husband
and wife is not sufficient to show that the wills were executed pursuant to a contract.
E.g., Twombly v. Twombly, 489 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1971). However, a substantial
number of courts have taken the view that while the mere execution of joint wills in
a single document is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that execution was
pursuant to a contractual arrangement, the presence of such pronouns as "we" and
"ours" are reflective of contractual intent. In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366,
454 P.2d 438 (1969); In re Estate of Bright, 482 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1972); Estate
of Chayka, 47 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970); see notes 20-24 supra, and
accompanying text.
32 In re Estate of Beaver, 206 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 1973).
33 Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973).
34 Estate of Randall v. McKibben, 191 N.W.2d 693, 699 (Iowa 1971).
35 Liberty Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 229 Ga. 677, 194 S.E.2d 91 (1972).
Fall, 19741
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Absent a statute of frauds problem, courts 36 have given approval to
oral contracts to make or not to change wills. But typical statutes of
frauds 37 do provide that contracts to make a will are not enforceable
unless they are in writing and signed by the maker, or by some other
person at the maker's express direction. Moreover, a recent decision of
the California Supreme Court3 8 has interpreted a similar statute of frauds
to likewise require that contractual agreements not to change wills be in
writing. Notwithstanding its ostensible applicability, the statute of frauds
may not provide the last word. The same California court also held that
a change of position (in this case the wife's suicide) in reliance upon an
oral contract not to change a will estopps one from using the statute
of frauds as a defense.
39
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL WILLS:
A STUDY OF BROKEN PROMISES
To avoid inordinate verbosity, reference will 'be made to only a
selected number of court decisions reflective of judicial enforcement of
contractual wills when it has been established by proper evidence that
husband and wife wills were executed pursuant to a valid agreement.
Estate of Chayka,40 a 1970 case in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
has received much judicial attention. A husband and wife executed what
the court described as a joint, mutual and reciprocal will which consisted
of just one document using the pronouns "we" and "our" giving the
property to the survivor and providing that on the death of the survivor
the property should go to a named third person. The husband died and the
surviving wife gave most of the property which she received pursuant to
her husband's will to her second husband 'by inter vivos gift and thus there
was little property left for disposition under the wife's will to the third
person designated in the joint and contractual wills of the wife and her
first -husband. The court concluded that the wife had, by her action,
complied only with the form of the contractual will but not its substance.
Hence, her action of giving such property, taken under the will of her flirst
husband, to her second husband by inter vivos gift, breached the covenant
of good faith that accompanies any contract.4'
36 See Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971);
Cook v. Cook, 80 Wash. 2d 642, 497 P.2d 584 (1972).
37 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.04 (Page 1968). See Sherman v. Johnson, 159
Ohio St. 209, 112 N.E.2d 326 (1953), applying the Ohio statute.
38 Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973).
39 Id. at 752, 505 P.2d at 1033, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 193. See McIntosh v. Murphy, 52
Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A (1973).
4047 Wis. 2d 102, 176 N.W.2d 561 (1970).
41 Id. at 108, 176 N.W.2d at 564. The implied covenant of good faith has also been
utilized by the California Supreme Court in two decisions enforcing contractual wills.
See Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973); Redke
v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971).
[Vol 8:1
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The court, in ordering the second husband to reconvey the property
given to him by the second wife back to the estate of the second wife,
imposed the familiar remedy of a constructive trust. In concluding that
the wife had violated the implied covenant of good faith that is in every
contract, the court expressed the following views: The parties who contract
to make a joint, mutual and reciprocal will may express such contract in
a separate document; state in the joint will that it is contractual; or the
court may presume the contract from the fact that a joint will was
executed. In this factual pattern the court used the term "joint will" to
connote that husband and wife executed a single document as their
testamentary agreement. The court made the familiar statement that a
will is ambulatory, speaking only from the death of the maker. But the
court further concluded that if the wills of a husband and wife were made
pursuant to a contractual arrangement, then upon the death of one of the
spouses such contract becomes irrevocable because the survivor has
received the consideration promised.
In a subsequent decision, In re Estate of Schultz, 42 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin cited its Chayka decision of the previous year for the
proposition that two persons may enter into an agreement to make joint,
mutual and reciprocal wills to dispose of their respective estates according
to some mutually agreeable plan. The court clearly pointed out that those
seeking the protection of contractual wills must observe procedural and
remedial niceties. Those seeking to enforce the contractual wills had
legally protested the admission of the new will of the surviving wife to
probate. The court held that this was an improper remedy, that the
changed will of the deceased wife could properly be admitted to probate,
and that the remedy for those parties relying on the prior joint and
contractual will was the commencement of an action in equity to enforce
the contract rather than challenging the later will which expressly revoked
the joint will of the husband and wife.
At this point a 1968 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa should
be noted. In McCuen v. Hartsock,4 the evidence clearly established that
the husband and wife had entered into a joint and contractual will. The
facts further established that the husband received the proceeds of savings
accounts as the surviving joint tenant on the death of 'his wife, which
property, of course, is not passed by testamentary disposition." The
4253 Wis. 2d 643, 193 N.W.2d 655 (1972).
43 159 N.W.2d 455 (Iowa 1968).
44 Estate of Peters v. Comm'r, 386 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ford,
377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1967); Steinhauser v. Repko, 30 Ohio St. 2d 262, 285 N.E.2d
55 (1972). But not all alleged joint tenancy with right of survivorship devices are
valid, for the courts look through mere form to the "realities of ownership." See
O'Hair v. O'Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66 (1973) (joint tenancy with right of
survivorship not established between husband and wife). See also In re Estate of
Duiquid, 24 Ohio St. 2d 137, 265 N.E.2d 287 (1970).
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husband, in turn, established joint bank accounts with right of survivorship
in his son by utilizing the proceeds of the previous savings accounts which
the husband took by right of survivorship as a joint tenant with his
wife. Upon the death of the father, suit was brought to determine
ownership of the proceeds of the bank accounts in question.
In the suit it was contended that the son was not entitled to such
proceeds as a joint tenant with right of survivorship because the
establishment of such account by the husband constituted a breach of
the joint and contractual wills of the husband and wife. The court rejected
this contention and held that the establishment 'by the father of the joint
bank accounts with right of survivorship in his son did not violate the
contractual wills which he and his predeceased wife had executed.
The court concluded that the proceeds of the savings accounts did not
come to the husband through the estate of his deceased wife, and further
that since the husband disposed of such bank account proceeds by
inter vivos transfers to his son, such proceeds had never become a
part of the husband's estate.
Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York was presented with the
question of whether the surviving spouse involved in contractual wills
executed by a husband and wife (which consisted of an agreement to
devise a specific parcel of real property to named beneficiaries) is
privileged to make an inter vivos gift of that same property to a third
person. In Schwartz v. Horn,4 the court answered this question in the
negative and concluded that the surviving widow could not disregard her
contract obligation, and hence could not, after her husband's death, make
an inter vivos gift of the property to another. The evidentiary problem
was not formidable in this case since each of the separately executed wills
of the husband and wife specifically recited that a contract had been
entered into by the husband and wife, whereby it was agreed" that the
respective wills they had executed would not be changed or altered by
the:parties except upon the written consent first obtained by the other
party to the agreement.
Against this factual background the court concluded:
Mrs. Horn expressly agreed to leave her mile square road home
to her son and daughter if she outlived her husband. He did
predecease her and, having had the benefit of his bounty, she may
not violate her contract with impunity.4
The court -further reflected the rationale of its decision by the following
statement:
Completely insupportable is the defendant's claim that Mrs. Horn
did no more than obligate herself not to change or alter her will
'5 31 N.Y.2d 275, 290 N.E.2d 816, 338 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1972).
46Id. at 278-79, 290 N.E.2d at 817, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
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and that she was free during her lifetime, to do as she desired
with the mile square road property.47
Hence, without expressly stating so, the court applied the constructive
condition of the "implied covenant of good faith" 48 that is in every
contract and concluded that inter vivos gifts by the surviving spouse
contrary to the contractual will agreement is an actionable breach
of the contract.
The Schwartz litigation was precipitated by an action by the
beneficiary of the contractual wills to recover the real property which was
devised under the mutual will, but which the surviving spouse had given
to a third person. The court further concluded that a mutual and
contractual will under these facts would not prohibit the surviving testator
from transferring the property, even if such transfer defeated the purpose
of the contractual will arrangement, when the property or its proceeds are
used to meet the daily needs of such surviving spouse. 49 Because of a lack
of proof on this point, the case was remanded with the observation by the
court that if the plaintiff could prove the allegations of her complaint
that on remand she would be entitled to a remedy in the nature of
a constructive trust.
In a 1972 decision, In re Estate of Philips,5 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reaffirmed the rationale of its Chayka decision. Again the
Wisconsin court applied the concept that a joint will (in its contractual
aspects) becomes irrevocable at the time one party dies. In this unique
factual pattern, a doctor and his wife executed a single document as their
respective wills using the familiar pronouns "we" and "our" and the usual
indications of mutual assent. With commendable candor the doctor and
his wife further recited in the single will document that it was agreed by
the survivor, to whom all of the property had been devised and bequested,
that after the death of both testators the property would be divided
equally among the testators' respective heirs. The novel and unique
question in this case, which literally transcended the obvious contract
obligation, was presented because the wife who received $33,919 from
her husband's estate then by clairvoyant or adroit investment policies
increased the value of the estate to $451,042 at the time of her death.
There was, understandably, no unanimity of opinion among the heirs of
the husband and the heirs of the wife as to whether the heirs of the
husband would participate equally in the entire estate of $451,042. The
contractual wills defined "equal division" as one-half of the entire joint
property of the testators at the time of the first testator's death. It was
held by the court that the heirs of the husband, under the contractual will
471d. at 279, 290 N.E.2d at 818, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 616.48 See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
4931 N.Y.2d at 280-81, 290 N.E.2d at 819, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
50 54 Wis. 2d 296, 195 N.W.2d 485 (1972).
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arrangement, would participate equally with the heirs of the wife in the
entire value of the estate of $451,042. In this respect the court concluded:
At the time of her death, Mrs. Philips possessed no assets
independently acquired by way of other inheritance, gift or other-
wise; her entire estate of over $451,000 was the result of the
investment, sale and reinvestment of assets received from her
husband's estate in 1946.51
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has joined the numerous courts that
have enforced contractual wills. In Geiger v. Geiger,5
2 the court concluded
that the mutual promises of the husband and wife constituted adequate
consideration for the agreement not to change their respective wills, and
that the husband could not, after the death of his wife, execute a new
will with substantial changes. In so holding, the court was, of course,
following the established principle that while a will is ambulatory and
may be changed, even if made pursuant to a contract, such change will
be a breach of the contractual arrangement and will be appropriately
enforced. In this case the court ordered that the estate of the deceased
husband be distributed in accordance with the provision of his prior will
made pursuant to contract with his predeceased spouse. The court noted
that "the agreement.., was not revocable."
A 1971 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa clearly reflects that
court's commitment to the enforcement of contractual wills despite its
prior decision in McCuen v. Hartsock 4 which held that contractual wills
do not affect property received by the surviving spouse as joint tenant
with right of survivorship in a bank account. In Estate of Randell v.
McKibben ' the court held that where husband and wife had executed
joint wills and codicils and where there was obviously a bilateral contract
superimposed upon their respective wills, such contractual wills governed
the disposition of all of the surviving widow's estate. The court fuither
held that a subsequent will executed by the surviving wife in cojafrav enti6h
of her contractual arrangement With her husband was not effectuaI.. In a
declaratory judgment action, ownership of the real property was determined
in favor of those beneficiaries under the prior contractual will.
In Crail v. Blakely, 6 a case which had been previously referred
to, the Supreme Court of California was faced with a tragic factual
situation in which a wife became so apprehensive that her husband would
subsequently change their respective wills, which were executed pursuant
to an oral contract, that she committed suicide. The evidence established
51 Id. at 299, 195 N.W.2d at 487.
52 185 Neb. 700, 178 N.W.2d 575 (1970).
53 Id. at 702, 178 N.W.2d at 576.
54 159 N.W.2d 455 (Iowa 1968).
55 191 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1971).
56 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (973).
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that the respective wills of the husband and wife provided that the first to
die was to leave his or her estate to the survivor and the survivor agreed
to leave, 'by testamentary disposition, the combined estate to their children.
After the death of the wife, the husband executed another will which did
not conform to the contractual testamentary disposition pattern provided
for in the oral contract. Various witnesses testified in the trial court as to
the contractual arrangement between the husband and wife with respect
to their wills. The plaintiffs in this case were the children who brought the
suit to enforce the oral agreement between their parents whereby
the surviving parent would devise and bequeath all of their combined
property to such children. It was further alleged and proven that the
father, who survived the -mother, left the bulk of his estate to various
charities and only one-fourteenth thereof to his children.
The ultimate holding of the court was the imposition of a constructive
trust in favor of the children as against those claiming under the second
will of the father. Several novel arguments were presented to the court in
this case. The defendants asserted that the children's claim for relief
should have been denied on the basis of the wife's "unclean hands" in
killing herself. It was contended that to enforce the oral contract in favor
of the plaintiffs would 'be contrary to the public policy against suicide.
The California Supreme Court retorted that these arguments "border
upon frivolity." The court concluded:
We are not dealing here with a contract contemplating the suicide
of one of the parties, but a contract to make and maintain wills
leaving property to plaintiffs. Such a contract as we have recently
noted, is neither void nor unenforceable as against public policy .... 5
It was held that the defendants were estopped to assert as a defense
California's statute of frauds which requires that an agreement to make a
will be in writing. The basis of this conclusion was that the evidence
showed that the wife had feared that the husband would breach the
agreement, or- that. he might prevail upon her to rescind the agreement.
This, coupled with the fact of the wife's suicide, established the requisite
change of position in reliance upon the oral agreement necessary to
invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Thus, it clearly appears that the California
Supreme Court, because it deemed it necessary to invoke the estoppel
doctrine, must have concluded that California's somewhat typical statute
of frauds is applicable, not only to contracts to make a will, but also to
agreements not to change the testamentary dispositions.
Because of its startling contemporary aspects, only one additional
case will be referred to. That judicial enforcement of contractual wills has
continuing viability is indicated in a May 12, 1973, decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas.5 8 In that decision the husband and wife
57 Id. at 755, 505 P.2d at 1036, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
58 Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 206, 510 P.2d 167 (1973).
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executed a typical joint and contractual will whereby each of their wills
was set forth in a single document using the familiar pronoun approach
of "we bequeath and devise." The thrust of the contractual wills was to
create a life estate in the surviving spouse. It was agreed that the remainder
interest would be preserved for and would ultimately be distributed to
their children. In this rather unusual action, the remaindermen-the
children-sought and obtained the appointment of a trustee over
the property to prevent the surviving wife from disposing of the property
without consideration. The court concluded that under the joint and
contractual wills of the husband and wife, the survivor's right of
disposition did not include the right to dispose of the property without
consideration, and that the contractual limitation extended to all property
in the hands of the survivor, regardless of whether it came to the survivor
under the will or was in survivor's own name at the time of the other's
death. Thus, the court specifically held that the provision in the will, giving
the survivor the right to sell, mortgage, lease, encumber or dispose of said
property during his or her lifetime, did not include the right to dispose
of the property without consideration.
CONTRACT VICTORY: TAX DEFEAT
The basic purpose of the marital deduction granted by section 2056
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is to equate for federal estate tax
purposes spouses living in common law jurisdictions to those living in
community property states.59 The Code accomplishes this basic purpose
by permitting a deduction in the decedent's estate equal to the value of
the property interests which are included in his or her gross estate, and
which property is transferred or "passed" to the surviving spouse. The
maximum deduction allowable is 50 percent of the "adjusted gross estate"
which is defined as the gross estate less the aggregate amount of certain
deductions such as claims, losses, etc. ° In order for the marital deduction
to apply, however, it is critical that the property interests passed from
the decedent to his or her spouse are not so-called terminable interests. A
terminable interest is defined as an interest which will terminate or fail
upon the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency, or
on the failure of an event or contingency to occur.61 With respect to such
terminable interests, no marital deduction will be allowed. 2 It is precisely
59 See United States v. Stafp, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
60 Ir. Rav. CODE OF 1954 §§ 2053, 2054, 2056(c) (1)-(c) (2) (A).
61 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 § 2056(b) (1).
62 Id. The congressional philosophy behind denying the marital deduction to decedents'
estates to the extent of any terminable interests passed is based on a desire to prevent
the wholesale evasion of the federal estate tax by skillful use of terminable interests.
For example, but for the terminable interest rule, a husband in a common law jurisdic-
tion could bequeath a life estate in property to his surviving spouse, which property
would then escape taxation in the husband's estate by application of the marital
deduction. In turn, the property would escape taxation in the wife's estate because,
possessing only a life estate, the property would not be included in her estate at death.
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on this point that contractual wills create problems. Courts have held that
a contractual obligation superimposed on the testamentary disposition
converts what would otherwise have been a bequest or devise in fee
simple into a mere life estate, an interest which is obviously terminable
upon the death of the surviving spouse.63
The general rule that terminable interests do not qualify for the
marital deduction has been compromised by a somewhat liberal exception.
The exception provides that a life estate, in or out of trust, with the
power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such
specific portion (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or the
estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either), shall under certain
specified statutory conditions qualify for the marital deduction. 64 However,
this exception is further restricted by the concluding paragraph of the
statute which provides that the exception "shall apply only if such power
in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest,.. . whether
exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and
in all events."6 As related to contractual wills, the court in Estate of
Opal v. Comm'r 8 concluded that
[tihe power to appoint the entire interest ... as unqualified owner
must include the power to appoint to one's self or one's estate in such
a manner that the property will be free of conditions imposed by the
testator on the devolution of the property on the survivor's death 67
Thus, contractual wills relate to the surviving spouse not having absolute
power of appointment over the terminable interest (life estate) passed
under the will.68
In view of the recent federal court decisions6 9 holding that husband
and wife contractual wills result in the surviving spouse taking only a life
esEstate of Krampf v. Comm'r, 464 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1972); Estate of Opal v.
Comm'r, 450 F.2d1085 (2d Cir. 1971); Batterton v. United States, 406 F.2d 247
(5th Cir. 1969). A will does not necessarily have to be contractual to impose
conditions which will make the interests passed thereunder terminable. In Hansen
v. Vinal, 413 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1969), a decedent's estate was denied the marital
deduction under a will which, while not contractual, devised and bequeathed all of
the decedent's property to his wife, conditioned upon the wife's living long enough to
survive the probate of the husband's will. Under such a condition, the court found
the interests passed to be terminable.
64 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b) (5).
65 Id.
66 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971).
67 Id. at 1089.
68 Note, however, that a contractual will imposes obligations on the surviving spouse
only as to property passing by the will. Contractual wills do not prevent allowance of
the marital deduction as to the following non-probate assets: bank account held in
the joint names of the husband and wife with right of survivorship; real estate held
by the spouses as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and insurance on one
spouse's life payable to the other spouse. United States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93 (8th
Cir. 1967).
69 See cases cited note 63 supra.
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estate with the subsequent loss of the marital deduction in the estate of
the first spouse to die, it would indeed take a most sanguine outlook
to view the judicial enforcement of the contract as overshadowing the
tax loss. Since the marital deduction grants a maximum deduction of
50 percent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate passing to the surviving
spouse, one need not resort to an abacus to grasp the tax impact of losing
the marital deduction in the face of federal estate tax rates which range
from 3 to 77 percent. 70
CONCLUSION
It would be indulging in random speculation to proffer definitive
reasons and rationale for what seems to be an increasing quest of spouses
for the euphoric comfort of executing their wills pursuant to a contract
which commits them not to change the testamentary dispositive pattern
agreed upon. Not only have such wills resulted in a proliferation of
litigation with the resultant uncertainty and delay in estate administration
and distribution, but also the transcendent and superimposed contract
burden 'has been held by an increasing number of federal courts to grant
the surviving spouse only the legal equivalent of a life estate which does
not qualify for the marital deduction under the federal estate tax law. The
loss of the marital deduction in the estate of the first spouse to die and
the possibly disastrous tax consequence associated with that loss suggest the
obvious; devises under contractual wills should be avoided in favor of
inter vivos and testamentary trusts. Professional management of the trust
assets by a bank trust department to protect the surviving spouse from
profligate spending and ingenuous unawareness of the predatory schemers
can be gained, with the preservation of the marital deduction by use of
trust disposition which conforms to the provisions of the marital deduction
provision of the Code. For example, it would seem that the device of the
inter vivos trust or the testamentary trust would best serve to allay
anxieties beyond the grave while at the same time giving the spouse an
interest which, while not the complete equivalent of fee simple title, is
certainly a close approximation in that there is a right to income for life
with a general power of appointment. Then too, the marital deduction
trust which is a frequently used device in estate tax planning (often in
response to the qualms of one spouse about the ability or desire of the
surviving spouse to appropriately manage and conserve assets and to
prevent profligate spending thereof) may be coupled with a supplementary
trust whereby the wife is given only a limited power (not a general
power) of appointment. The resulting life estate is only a terminable
interest and as such is not taxable 'as a part of the wife's estate at her
death. Hence, one tax generation is "skipped" because the trust usually
provides for a remainder over to the children of the married couple. It is
70 Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2001,
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beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore "marital deduction trusts"
and nonmarital deduction trusts which tax-skip a generation by granting to
the surviving spouse only slightly less than the benefits of full ownership,
without causing the trust assets to be taxed in the estate of the first spouse
to die. Suffice to point out that the benefits of the marital deduction may
be preserved if the various requisites of the federal estate tax law
are complied with.
Although attorneys, as estate tax planners, can perhaps effect little
increase in the marital confidence inspired by trust and devotion, it is
suggested that recent court decisions should temper any enthusiasm by
attorneys to draft wills for husband and wife clients who seek contractual
assurance that things will go as they planned even after death. For
judicial enforcement of the contractual wills may turn to bittersweet
regrets when the Internal Revenue Service rules that the contractual wills
have resulted in only a terminable interest 'being passed to the surviving
spouse, thus depriving the decedent's estate of the marital deduction.
In summation a caveat is appropriate: Avoid contractual wills where
death taxes are a planning consideration.
17
Dewey: Contractual Wills
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss1/5
